# Slither Triage — v0.11.5, 63 detectors, filtered: lib/test/script, info+low excluded

41 raw results → 4 detector classes. Every finding reviewed; none exploitable. Detail:

## 1. `arbitrary-send-erc20` — ReserveManager.depositStable (1 finding)
`safeTransferFrom(from, …)` with caller-supplied `from`.
**Status: SAFE by access control.** `depositStable` is `onlyPSM` (reverts `NotPSM`), and the
PSM always passes `msg.sender` as `from`. No path lets an attacker specify another user's
address. Defense-in-depth option for auditors to consider: move the `transferFrom` into the
PSM itself so the reserve only ever receives.

## 2. `divide-before-multiply` (2 findings)
- `PSM.redeem`: `usdrWad / SCALE` then `* SCALE` — **intentional**, protocol-favoring
  rounding: burns the full WAD, pays the floored 6-dec amount. Dust accrues to the protocol.
- `LiquidationEngine._currentPrice`: Dutch decay span computed at BPS precision then scaled
  by time — max error 1 wei of price per step, keeper-neutral. **Accepted.**

## 3. `reentrancy-no-eth` (several findings, all in CDPVault/LiquidationEngine)
Pattern: state written after external calls to `usdr.burn/mint`, `vault.seize`,
`guard.reportCdpShortfall`, `buffer.absorbBadDebt`.
**Status: NOT exploitable in this system:**
- Every flagged function is `nonReentrant` (OZ ReentrancyGuard).
- The external targets are **protocol-internal contracts** (USDR, SolvencyGuard,
  SurplusBuffer, CDPVault) — USDR is a plain OZ ERC20 with no transfer hooks / callbacks;
  none of these can re-enter the caller.
- Collateral transfers use SafeERC20 to standard ERC-20s (no ERC-777 support; listing
  policy: hook-token collateral is prohibited — noted for governance).
**Action for auditors:** confirm the no-hook-collateral listing policy is enforced
operationally when adding new collateral types.

## 4. `unused-return` (10 findings)
All are deliberate partial destructuring of multi-return values
(`(price,) = oracle.getPrice(...)`, `(, int256 answer, ...) = latestRoundData()`), or
`buffer.absorbBadDebt` whose uncovered remainder is tracked inside the buffer
(`badDebtOutstanding`). **Accepted; no silent failure paths.**

---
Re-run command:
```
slither . --filter-paths "lib|test|script" --exclude-informational --exclude-low
```